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THE HISTORY  OF  THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE  DISTINCTION
MORTON  J.  HORWiTZt
The  distinction  between  public and  private  realms  arose  out
of a double movement  in modern  political  and legal  thought.  On
the one hand, with the emergence  of the nation-state  and  theories
of sovereignty in the sixteenth and seventeenth  centuries,  ideas  of a
distinctly public realm began to crystallize.'  On the other hand, in
reaction  to  the  claims  of monarchs  and, later,  parliaments  to  the
unrestrained  power  to make  law,  there developed'a  countervailing
effort  to  stake  out  distinctively  private  spheres  free  from  the  ei-
croaching  power  of the  state.2  Natural rights  theories  were  elabo-
rated  in  the seventeenth  century  for  the purpose  of  setting limits
on state power, both over property and religious  conscience.  Rights
theories were therefore not only efforts  to incorporate  into law what
one writer  has  called  a philosophy  of  "possessive  individualism,"  3
but  also  to  provide  an  important  basis  for  arguing  for  religious
toleration.
One can trace  the emergence  of a distinctively  public realm in
various  legal doctrines.  By the  late medieval  period,  for  example,
English law  had already begun  to  draw  a  distinction  between  two
different roles  of the monarch  as landowner.  First were  the  lands
the  King  held as  feudal  lord.  These  he  could  alienate  as  private
property.  But, increasingly,  English  law  defined a  second  category
of crown lands-in  essence, public  lands-which he  could not  alien-
ate.  Here  we  see an  example  of  the  gradual  emergence  of a  dis-
tinctively  public  realm,  which  in the  field  of  crown  ownership  of
land  finally  crystallized  in  seventeenth  century  struggles  over  the
King's  power  to  alienate  land  between  high  and  low  watermark.4
Taxation  provides  a  fascinating  example  of  the  emergence  of
the  public/private  distinction.  As  late  as  the  sixteenth  century,
English  judges  still  analyzed  taxation,  not  as  an  exaction  by  the
f Professor  of  Law,  Harvard  University.  A.B.  1959,  College  of  the  City  of
New  York;  Ph.D.  1964,  LL.B.  1967,  Harvard  University.  Member,  Massachusetts
Bar.
I See  D.  HANSON,  FROM  KINGDOM  TO  CoavnVonvzALT  1-19  (1970).
2 See  J.  API'LEBY,  ECONOMIC  THOUG=T  AND  IDEOLOGY  IN  SEVENTEENT-CEN-
TuRY  ENGLAND  62-63  (1978).  See  generally  J.  COUGH,  FUNDAMENTAL  LAW  IN
ENGLISH  CONSTITUTONAL  HIISTORY  (1961);  C.  MCPHERSON,  TB:E  PoLI  CAL  ThmoRY
OF  PoSSEssvE  INDIVIDUAISMm  (1970).
3 C.  MCPBERSON,  supra note  2.
4 See D.  HANSON,  supra note  1, at  143-46.
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state  but  as  a  private  gift from  the  donor-the  taxpayer.  Parlia-
ment  was thought  to  have  simply arranged  this consensual  private
transaction."  Only with the development  of theories  of sovereignty
in  the seventeenth  century did taxation  begin  to  be  understood  as
part of public law.
Another  set  of  issues  illustrates  the  same  point,  highlighting
how recently it was that a  distinctively public  realm  came  to  be  a
generally understood part of political and legal consciousness.  Until
the nineteenth  century,  lawsuits  involving  the removal  of a  public
official  from office  were analyzed  more frequently  than not  as  ques-
tions  of  property.  The  officeholder  often  successfully  claimed  a
property interest in the office from which he could not be divested.5
So we see,  on one side,  that it was only gradually  that English
and American  law came  to  recognize  a  public  realm distinct  from
medieval  conceptions  of  property.  And  equally  gradually  legal
doctrines developed  the idea of a separate  private  realm  free  from
public power.
Although  one can find  the origins of the idea of a distinctively
private realm in the natural-rights  liberalism  of Locke  and his  suc-
cessors,  only in the nineteenth  century  was  the public/private  dis-
tinction  brought to  the  center  of the  stage  in American  legal  and
political theory.  Before this could occur,. it was  necessary to under-
mine  an  earlier  tradition  of  republican  thought  that  had  closely
identified private  virtue and public interest.7
The emergence  of the market  as  a central legitimating  institu-
tion  brought  the public/private  distinction  into  the  core  of  legal
discourse  during  the  nineteenth  century."  Although,  as  we  have
seen, there were earlier anticipations  of a distinction between public
law and private law, only the nineteenth century produced  a funda-
mental conceptual  and architectural  division  in the way we under-
stand the law.  One of the central goals  of nineteenth  century legal
thought  was  to  create  a  clear  separation  between  constitutional,
criminal,  and  regulatory  law-public  law-and  the  law  of  private
transactions-torts,  contracts,  property, and commercial  law.
5Lampson,  Some  New  Light  on  the  Growth  of  Parliamentary Sovereignty:
Wimbish versus  Taillebois, 35  Am.  PoL.  Scr.  REv.  952  (1941).
GW.  NELSON,  AMErICANIZATION  OF  THE  COMMON  LAW  125  (1975);  Nelson,
Offlceholding And Powerwielding: An Analysis of the Relationship Between Structure
And  Style  In  American Administrative History, 10  LAW  & Soc'y  Ruv.  187,  194-95
(1976).
7G. WOOD,  THE  CREATION  OF  THE  AMmcAN  REPuBmc,  1776-1787,  at  53-65,
608-10  (1969).
8 The  classic  work  is  K.  PoLANyI,  THE  GREAT  TRANsFoRMAnToN  (1944).  See
generally P.  A=AH,  THE  RISE  AND  FA.LL  OF  FREmoM  OF  CONTRACT  226-31
(1979).
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the entirely  novel  separation  between public  and  private  corpora-
tions in  the  Dartmouth College Case9  decided  in  1819.  Its  pur-
pose--certainly  the  purpose  of  Justice  Story's  famous  concurring
opinion-was  to free the newly emerging business corporation  from
the regulatory  public  law  premises  that  had  dominated  the  prior
law  of  corporations,  whether  municipal  or  trading  corporations,
both of which were regarded  as arms of the state.
Another  more  all-encompassing  example  is  the  effort  of nine-
teenth  century  thinkers  to contractualize-that  is,  to  "privatize"-a
host of common law doctrines that had previously served to regulate
bargains.  The watering-down  of doctrines like the rule that equity
will not enforce unfair contracts  was inspired by the idea that con-
tract  is  an entirely  private  institution  between  consenting  individ-
uals in which  the state should have no  interest.1 0  By  1850,  it was
common for courts to permit parties  to contract  out of common law
duties,  which  only  one  generation  earlier  had  been  regarded  as
beyond their power to alter."
A  final  example  of  the  persistent  effort  of  late  nineteenth-
century  legal thinkers  to  create  a sharp distinction  between  public
and  private law  was  the movement  to  eliminate  punitive  damages
in  tort.  Because  the purpose  of punitive  damages  was  to  use  the
tort law to regulate conduct, not merely  to  compensate  individuals
for injuries,  their imposition  was  regarded  as  a usurpation  of  the
public law  functions  of the  criminal  law.  Several  states  abolished
punitive damages  on the grounds that combining public and private
law functions was an unhealthy and dangerous business.' 2
What  were  the  concerns  that created  a virtual  obsession  with
separating public and private  law, both conceptually and practically,
during the nineteenth  century?  Above  all was the  effort of ortho-
dox judges  and jurists  to  create  a legal  science  that would  sharply
separate  law  from  politics.  By  creating  a  neutral  and  apolitical
system  of  legal  doctrine  and  legal  reasoning  free  from  what  was
thought to be the dangerous  and unstable  redistributive  tendencies
of democratic politics,  legal  thinkers hoped  to  temper the  problem
of "tyranny  of  the majority."  Just  as nineteenth-century  political
economy  elevated  the market  to  the status  of the  paramount  insti-
9Trustees  of  Dartmouth  College  v. Woodward,  17  U.S.  (4  Wheat.)  518,  559,
669-73  (1819).
10  See generally P. A2-.rAH,  supra note 8.
I'M. HoRwrrz,  TBE  TRANSFORmATION  OF  AMERICAN  LAW  201-07  (1977).
12 See,  e.g.,  Murphy  v. Hobbs,  7 Colo.  541,  5  P.  119  (1884);  Fay v. Parker,
53  N.H.  342  (1872).
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tution for distributing rewards on a supposedly neutral and apoliti-
cal  basis,  so  too  private  law  came  to  be  understood  as  a  neutral
system. for facilitating voluntary market transactions and vindicating
injuries  to  private  rights.  The  hostility  to  statutes  expressed  by
nineteenth-century  judges and  legal thinkers reflected  the view that
state regulation  of private relations  was a  dangerous  and unnatural
public intrusion into a system  based on private  rights.
The  sharp  distinction  between  public  and  private  began  to
come under attack in reaction to the Supreme  Court's  1905 decision
in Lochner v. New  York,13 constitutionalizing  freedom  of contract.
For  the  next  thirty  years,  the  most  brilliant  and  original  legal
thinkers  America  has  ever  had  devoted  their  energies  to  exposing
the conservative  ideological  foundations  of  the  public/private  dis-
tinction.  Culminating in the Legal Realist Movement  of the  1920's
and  1930's, judges such  as Holmes, Brandeis,  and Cardozo  and legal
theorists  such  as  Roscoe  Pound,  Walter  Wheeler  Cook,  Wesley
Hohfeld,  Robert Lee  Hale, Arthur  Corbin, Warren  Seavey,  Morris
Cohen,  and  Karl  Llewelyn  devoted  themselves  to  attacking  the
premises behind the public/private  distinction.14  Paralleling  argu-
ments then current in political economy, they ridiculed the invisible-
hand  premise  behind  any  assumption  that  private  law  could  be
neutral  and apolitical.  All  law  was  coercive  and  had  -distributive
consequences,  they  argued.  It  must  therefore  be  understood  as  a
delegation  of coercive  public power  to individuals,  and could only
be  justified  by  public  policies.  Contract,  that  most  "private"  of
nineteenth-century  legal categories,  was  reconceptualized  as  simply
a delegation  of public power that could be justified only by public
purposes.  Fuller  and  Perdue's  famous  1936  article  on  contract
damages  15  demonstrated  that awarding  damages  for breach  of  con-
tract  could  not  be  deduced  from  the  "logic"  of  contract  or  from
the will  of the parties, but was  a state-imposed sanction  determined
by the choice  among policies.  Shelley v. Kraemer  1 6 is  perhaps  the
most  famous  culmination  of a  generation  of successful  attacks  on
the public/private distinction.
By  1940,  it was  a sign of legal sophistication  to understand  the
arbitrariness  of the division  of law  into  public and  private  realms.
13 198  U.S.  45  (1905).
'4  See,  e.g.,  Cohen,  Property and  Sovereignty,  13  Commin  L.Q.  8  (1927);
Cohen,  The Basis of Contract, 46  HAav.  L.  REv.  553  (1933);  Hale,  Force and the
State:  A  Comparison of  "Political" and  "Economic"  Compulsion,  35  CoLum.  L.
REv.  149  (1935);  Pound,  Liberty  of  Contract, 18  YALE  LJ. 454  (1909).
15 Fuller  & Perdue,  The  Reliance Interest in  Contract Damages (pt.  1),  46
YALE  L.J.  52  (1936).
16  334  U.S.  1  (1948).
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No advanced  legal thinker of that period, I am certain, would have
predicted that forty years later the public/private  dichotomy would
still be alive and, if anything, growing in influence.  What accounts
for its surprising vitality?
Until  World War  II, twentieth-century  progressivism  empha-
sized  the role  of  the state  in  creating  institutions  that  would  pro-
mote  a public interest.17  In reaction  to  the  spread  of totalitarian-
ism, progressivism  after World War II capitulated  to  the argument
that any  substantive  conception  of  the public  interest  was  simply
the first step on the road  to totalitarianism.18  The idea  of a public
interest  thus  came  to  be  formulated  in  the  purely  proceduralist
terms  of interest-group  pluralism-simply  as  whatever  was  the  out-
come  of competition  among interest groups.19  This  was,  it should
be  emphasized,  a  twentieth-century  return  to  a  market  theory  of
the public interest-but  this  time the competitors  were groups  and
the market was  the political process.
Earlier,  progressivism  posited  a  sharp  conflict  between  a  sub-
stantive  public  interest  and  private  self-interest,  and  regarded  a
primary  function  of  the state  as  creating  institutions  that  would
transcend  private  self-interest.  Unless  the  individualism  and  self-
ishness  that was  part of the culture  of capitalism  could  be  moder-
ated, they believed, the system could not survive.  Most of the Legal
Realists  operated  out  of  this  political  paradigm  and  understood
their  task  to  be  the  moderation  and  limitation  of  private  greed
and domination.
But  once  the  idea  of  a  substantive  public  interest  began  to
confront  ridicule  after  World  War  II,  the  function  of  the  state
came to be redefined as  simply a reflection of the sum of the vectors
of private  conflict.  Private  self-interest,  which  under  the  progres-
sive  program  was  to  be  kept suspiciously  in  check,  once  again  be-
came  the  only  legitimate  political  reality,  and  the  idea  of  an  au-
tonomous public realm began correspondingly to sink into oblivion.
The recent revival of natural-rights individualism  in legal and
political theory is a symptom of the collapse  of a belief in a distinc-
tively public realm standing above private self-interest.  It is not only
a dangerous symptom of the unravelling  of all sense of community,
17See  J.  LANis,  ThE  ADMINIsTRATIVE  PROCESS  10-16,  26-28,  98-99  (1938);
Lewis,  The "Consumer" and "Public" Interests Under Public Regulation, 46  J. POL.
ECON.  97,  105  (1938).
I8 See E.  PuRcELL,  ThE  CrIsIS  OF  DEmmOcaurC  TBEoRy:  Scxmn  c  NATURAL-
ISM  AND  THE PROBLEM OF VAL  E 235-66  (1973).
19 Schubert,  Is There A  Public Interest Theory?, in TBZ  PuBc  hINT  162.
(C.J.  Friedrich  ed.  1962);  Sorauf,  The  Conceptual Muddle,  in  id. 183.
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but  also  a  relapse  into  a  predatory  and  vicious  conception  of
politics.
Yet  reality  has  a  funny  way  of intruding upon  theory.  The
public/private  distinction  could  approximate  the  actual  arrange-
ment of legal and political  institutions  only in  a society  and. econ-
omy  of  relatively  small,  decentralized,  nongovernmental  units.
Private  power began  to become  increasingly  indistinguishable  from
public  power  precisely  at  the  moment,  late  in  the  nineteenth.
century, when large-scale  corporate concentration  became  the norm.
The  attack  on  the  public/private  distinction  was  the  result  of  a
widespread  perception  that  so-called  private  institutions  were  ac-
quiring coercive  power that had formerly  been  reserved  to  govern-
ments.
The contemporary  erosion  of the public/private  distinction  in
many areas of  legal  doctrine described  by Professor  Stone 20  is  but
another symptom of the passing of that world  of nineteenth-century
decentralized competitive capitalism  that once made that distinction
a rough approximation  of reality.
20  See  Stone,  Corporate Vices and Corporate Virtues: Do  Public/Private  Dis-
tinctions Matter?, 130  U.  PA.  L.  REv.  1441  (1982).
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